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to rear the child in the Protestant religion on the ground that she found
it difficult to rear him in a religion different from her own, and that this
would be in the best interest and welfare of the child, this court might
possibly have done what the court did in the Martin case. The fact of
the mother's custody makes this result even more likely. On the other
hand, the court could do what was done in the Goldman case and con-
tinue to enforce the agreement of the parties on the ground that it is in
the best interest of the child to continue rearing him as a Catholic. If the
mother had taken the action suggested above, whichever way the court
held, its decision would necessarily be based upon what it found to be in
the best interest and welfare of the child, and not upon the fact that the
parents had previously reached a particular agreement in the matter.
It seems that Mrs. Lynch has taken the wrong step in openly violat-
ing the decree of the court without first seeking a modification. Under
the cases discussed the courts have taken jurisdiction to enter decrees
regarding the religious upbringing of children where the best interest of
the child required it. As the court in the principal case has exercised
jurisdiction under similar circumstances, Mrs. Lynch's appeal amounts
to no more than an attempted collateral attack on the decree. 17
MAITLAND Guy FREED.
Constitutional Law-Estoppel to Raise the Constitutional Question
In Convent of the Sisters of Saint Joseph v. Winston-Salem' the
North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine that a party may
be estopped to assert a statute's unconstitutionality through some prior
conduct on his part. In that case the Convent of Saint Joseph sought a
declaration of rights under the zoning ordinances of Winston-Salem and
"' Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 (1921) in which the Court said at page 189:
"An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers
upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties
therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the
action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of
a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first
instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision
is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt
of its lawful authority, to be punished." See also State v. Baldwin, 57 Iowa 266
(1881) which held that in injunction proceedings the order of a court having juris-
diction of the matter and of the parties, even if erroneous, is not void, and until
reversed must be obeyed.
'243 N. C. 316, 90 S. E. 2d 879 (1956). The plaintiff acquired a large private
estate in a residential area of Winston-Salem zoned against all but residences,
churches, and public schools. Through a special-use permit, permission was obtained
by plaintiff from the city, over objections from residents, to create a private Catholic
school on the estate. After the school was established, the plaintiff applied to the
zoning board for modification of the permit to allow for the conversion of a garage
into a chemistry laboratory, which conversion necessitated structural alterations.
The modification was denied and plaintiff was held estopped to assert the uncon-
stitutionality of the zoning ordinances under which the original permit was granted.
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a special-use permit issued pursuant to the ordinances. Because the
plaintiff had applied for and had been granted a special-use permit to
convert a private estate into a church elementary school, it had employed
the statute and enjoyed its benefits. The plaintiff was therefore estopped
later to attack the ordinance's constitutionality when subsequently re-
fused a modification of the permit to structurally change the exterior of
the buildings.
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the unconstitutionality of laws and
legal proceedings has long been recognized by American courts;2 it
operates upon the basis of waiver, either express or implied, of the right
to challenge constitutionality. Such waiver of a statutory or constitu-
tional right is permissible where no public policy or morals are involved.
3
In view of these principles, an examination of the application of the
estoppel doctrine to situations where the right to challenge constitu-
tionality has been waived would be useful. This also necessarily implies
an examination of what constitutes waiver.
The two most generally recognized criteria giving rise to the estoppel
are the invocation or employment of a statute and the receipt of benefits
under a statute. One who employs a statute to his own use may later
be estopped to assert its unconstitutionality because the courts will not
allow one both to utilize and assail a statute at the same time.4 Invoking
the statute impliedly waives a defect in its constitutionality. 5 Similarly,
the acceptance of or participation in benefits from a statute may also
create the estoppel. 6 In the leading case, Daniels v. Tearney,7 the United
- Notes, 34 COL. L. REv. 1495 (1934) ; 48 HAgv. L. REv. 988 (1935).
In Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 569, 570 (M.D. Ala.
1934) the court stated, "A party may waive a rule of law or statute or even a con-
stitutional provision enacted for his benefit or protection, where it is conclusively a
matter of private right, and no consideration of public policy or morals is involved,
and, having once done so, he cannot subsequently invoke its protection."
'Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 271 U. S. 208
(1926); Hurley v. Commission of Fisheries of Virginia, 257 U. S. 223 (1921);
Nuckolls v. United States, 76 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Slick v. Hamaker, 28
F. 2d 103 (8th Cir. 1928).
In Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553 (1903), after the plaintiffs had inaugurated
proceedings under an Ohio statute providing for local improvements, presented a
petition for improvements, allowed a contract to be let, changed the plans as the
work progressed, periodically recognized the justice of assessments, and signed a
statement to induce the purchase of the county improvement bonds, they were
estopped from asserting the act's unconstitutionality even though it had been so
declared in another proceeding.
But cf. O'Brien v. Wheelock, 184 U. S. 450 (1901), where the construction of
a levee along the Mississippi River was not within the authority of the Illinois
statute. Some, including the plaintiff, petitioned for the levee and helped organize
the assessment district. There was no estoppel to contest the statute's authorization
of assessment. The statute had been held unconstituional in a previous litigation.
' There will be no waiver of a constitutional right when a statute is void ab
initio. St. Paul Trust & Savings Bank v. American Clearing Co., 291 Fed. 212,
229 (S. D. Fla. 1923).
'Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (1880) ; Rowekamp v. Mercantile-Commerce
Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 2d 852 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Federal Savings & Loan Cor-
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States Supreme Court held: "It is well settled as a general proposition
*.. that where a party has availed himself for his benefit of an unconsti-
tutional law, he cannot, in a subsequent litigation... aver its unconsti-
tutionality...."
One method of utilization of a statute which will erect the estoppel is
found when a legislative enactment provides a remedy and procedure for
ajudicating a right, which if violated, would create a distinct cause of
action in itself. Employing the statutory remedy and procedure rather
than the non-statutory common law remedy is held to concede the validity
of the statute.8 ,The one estopped has the privilege of ignoring or assum-
ing the invalidity of the statute and proceeding at law as if the statutory
remedy were non-existant. In Electric Company v. Dow,9 a New Hamp-
shire statute created a procedure for land owners to recover damages
suffered due to the flooding of property by mill dams. When the de-
fendant proceeded under the terms of the statute, he was estopped later
to assert that the statutory method of assessing damages was unconstitu-
tional. The court held that the "act confers a privilege which the plain-
tiff in error was at liberty to exercise or not as it thought fit."
Some difficulty in determining a course of conduct is experienced
when a party finds that if he chooses to proceed upon the assumption
that the statute is unconstitutional he courts a heavy penalty or loss of
rights granted by the statute, and if he invokes the statute he will be
estopped later to contest it. Here the risk rests upon the litigant.10
However, certain exceptions to the operation of the estoppel doctrine
exist.
Where the penalty established by the statute for non-compliance is
so great that the statute is invoked through duress, the United States
poration v. Grand Forks Building & Loan Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 248 (N. E. D. N. D,
1949) ; United States v. McIntosh, 2 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. Vir. 1932), cert. denied,
293 U. S. 586 (1934).
102 U. S. 415 (1880) supra note 6. The convention of Virginia enacted an
ordinance providing that no sale be made under a deed of trust without the consent
of the parties if the debtor put up a bond and security for payment of the debt.
The ordinance was passed in 1861 to protect debtors against whom there was an
execution in the hands of an officer. The defendants made their bond and otherwise
complied with the statute; the debt remaining unpaid when the ordinance expired,
suit on the bond was brought. Defendants claimed the bond was void and the
statute unconstitutional. Held, defendants were estopped to plead unconstitutionality.
' Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U. S. 581 (1887). Plaintiff
utilized an Act of Congress to recover the value of land taken by the United States.
The court, in answer to the plaintiff's later assault on the statute's constitutionality,
said: "The plaintiff, by adopting that mode, has assented to the taking of its prop-
erty by the Government for public use, and has agreed to submit the determination
of compensation to the tribunal named by Congress." Id. at 599.
166 U. S. 489 (1897). The statute provided that if either party elected, the
court would direct the issue to a jury to assess damages and judgment would be
rendered on the verdict of the jury with 50% added to the damages to make a
final judgment. The plaintiff in error contended that the method of assessing dam-
ages was repugnant to the federal Constitution.
"o Wall v. Parrott Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407 (1917); Great Falls
Manufacturing Company v. The Attorney General, 134 U. S. 581 (1888).
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Supreme Court has waived the invocation. This occurred in Union
Pacific Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,"
where the state exacted an exorbitant fee for a certificate of authority to
issue bonds pursuant to a statute which threatened heavy penalties and
blacklisting if the certificate were not obtained. The court held that
application for a certificate and payment of the fee under protest were
made under duress and did not waive the right to challenge the statute's
constitutionality. The same result has been reached in regard to federal
acts.12 This brings out the well-established rule that to create the estoppel
the invocation of the statute must be voluntary.
13
Another area of exception from the operation of the estoppel doctrine
appears in the field of foreign corporations. A foreign corporation, by
seeking and obtaining permission to do business in a state, does not
thereby become estopped from objecting to any provision in the state
statutes which is in conflict with the United States Constitution.1 4 Ac-
cepting a license does not impose an obligation to respect any provision
of the statute granting it that is repugnant to the Constitution.15 A desire
to maintain freedom of interstate commerce as well as a recognition that
citizens of one state have a constitutional right to engage in business in
another state give support to this rule.' 6
A less frequent exception to the operation of the estoppel doctrine is
seen when only one section of a statute which has been invoked is at-
tacked. When that section can be severed from the rest of the act with-
out invalidating the entire statute a party may attack it, although estopped
as to other portions of the statute.1T This is particularly true in cases
of statutory amendment.' 8
11 248 U. S. 67 (1918).
" Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934). Coal com-
panies acquiescing in and operating under the Bituminous Coal Code, formulated
under the National Industrial Recovery Act, were not estopped to contest its con-
stitutionality; the companies operated under threat of dire penalties, blacklisting,
and boycotts for noncompliance.
" Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931); Booth Fisheries Co. v.
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 271 U. S. 208 (1926), in regard to attacks
upon Workmen's Compensation Acts by employers who previously elected to obtain
the benefits of such acts.
" Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 (1927) ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Carr, 272 U. S. 494 (1926).
" Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 (1927) ; W. W. Cargill
Co. v. Minnesota cx tel Railroad & W. Com., 180 U. S. 452 (1901).
But cf. Pierce Oil Corporation v. Phoenix Refining Co., 259 U. S. 125 (1922);
In re Standard Oak Veneer Co., 173 Fed. 103 (E. D. Tenn. 1909).
When the United States places conditions upon its consent to be sued, a party
may not, in suit brought on that consent, contest the constitutionality of the condi-
tions; the bar of estoppel will operate in such a case. Upchurch Packing Co. v.
United States, 151 F. 2d 983 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 803 (1946).
16 Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 180 (W. D. Ky. 1902).
1? Where the act itself carries a separability provision, an attack upon one sec-
tion will not invalidate the entire act. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Torr,
15 F. Supp. 315 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Mojave River Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court of
California, 202 Cal. 717, 262 Pac. 724 (1928).
"- Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
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Although courts are in conflict as to whether a prior invocation of a
statute raises a permanent estoppel,' 9 it has been held in at least one case
that when changed circumstances reveal that the estoppel, although
validly invoked in a previous situation, would be violative of due process
in the present instance, the estoppel is erased.
20
The estoppel operates even when there has been a prior, separate
adjudication that the statute assailed is unconstitutional. As a general
rule such a prior adjudication will not relieve the party estopped.
21
The early view in this country was that a state court's adjudication
of the estoppel question was not reviewable by a federal court; this was
true in every case where there were two grounds upon which to base the
state court decision, one federal, and one non-federal. 22  Because the vast
majority of estoppel cases fit this description, there was almost no federal
review. The early cases held that the estoppel was not a federal question
and relied upon the non-federal ground as sufficient basis for the state
court determination. 23 This attitude of the United States Supreme Court
gave the state court decisions a peculiar strength. But, as state courts
abused this power of final decision, the federal courts gradually changed
" For cases holding that the bar by estoppel is permanent see Wall v. Parrott
Silver & Copper Co., 244 U. S. 407 (1917), and Great Falls Manufacturing Com-
pany v. The Attorney General, 124 U. S. 581 (1888).
For a case holding that the bar may not be a permanent one see Buck v. Kuyen-
dall, 267 U. S. 307 (1924).
2 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 776 (1931). State banks, after
failing to have the state bank guaranty law declared unconstitutional, endeavored to
conduct business pursuant to the law; they were not precluded for all time to assert
the law's unconstitutionality. The operation of the law was vastly different from
what was expected upon its enactment.
2" In Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415 (188), the court had this to say: "It is
well settled as a general proposition ...that where a party has availed himself
for his benefit of an unconstitutional law, he cannot ... aver its unconstitutionality
as a defense, although such unconstitutionality may have been pronounced by a
competent judicial tribunal in another suit. In such cases the principal of estoppel
applies with full force and effect."
See Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553 (1903), supra note 4, and St. Louis
Malleable Casting Co. v. Pendergast Construction Co., 260 U. S. 469, 472 (1923).
22Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361 (1893). The court held that accepting a
dividend on a negotiable note in composition proceedings under state insolvency
laws waived the right to enforce a debt after the debtor's discharge. The court
then cited Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 307 (1890), wherein that court said:
"... where, in action pending in a state court, two grounds of defense are inter-
posed, each broad enough to defeat a recovery, and only one of them involves a
federal question, and judgment passes for the defendant, the record must show, in
order to justify a writ of error from this court, that the judgment was rested upon
the disposition of the federal question; and if this does not affirmatively appear the
writ of error will be dismissed, unless the defense which does not involve a federal
question is so palpably unfounded that it cannot be presumed to have been enter-
tained by the state court."
2 Pierce v. Somerset Railway, 171 U. S. 641, 648 (1898). "A person may by
his acts or omission to act waive a right which he might otherwise have under the
Constitution of the United States as well as under a statute, and the question
whether he has or has not lost such right by his failure to act or by his action, is




their attitude24 until today they feel a duty to review state court decisions
invoking the estoppel.
25
Although the maxim that one must exhaust his administrative reme-
dies before being heard at law will estop many actions, there will be no
estoppel when the unconstitutionality of the statute under which an
administrative commission or agency operates is asserted. There are
two reasons for allowing a party to proceed directly in court; the inade-
quacy of administrative relief26 and the inability of the administrative
board to pass upon the constitutionality of the statute which created it.27
Two situations exist wherein the estoppel takes the form of res
judicata: (1) when a party acquiesces in a court order; an order, though
not a final decree, has the effect of res judicata when the parties, by in-
activity and acquiescence, have accepted it as disposing of the contro-
versy. The leading case is City of Trinidad et al. v. Madrid et al.
2 s
wherein the court denied the plaintiff's bill to enjoin the city's creating
a paving district and levying a special assessment, but continued the case
for the sole purpose of allowing plaintiffs to object to the sufficiency of
any hearing on assessment. After two years, during which time the im-
provements were completed and the city let contracts and issued bonds,
the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the ordinance; their acquiescence in
the court's decision was held to estop such an attack.29  (2) A failure to
appeal from an adverse ruling of an administrative body, thus inducing
4 Apparently the change in attitude came with state court abuse of the estoppel.
In Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 248 U. S.
67 (1918), the court, declaring its policy to review the state court's decision, said:
"Were it otherwise, as conduct under duress involves a choice, it always would be
possible for a State to impose an unconstitutional burden by the threat of penalties
worse than it in the case of failure to accept it, and then to declare the acceptance
voluntary... "
Also, possible confiscatory legislation being validly construed by state courts
via the estoppel doctrine helped bring this change in attitude about. Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931).
" Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, stpra
note 24; Enterprise Irrig. Dist. v. Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157 (1917).
" Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 773 (1947). The United
States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Renegotiation Acts, held that: "It
is true that the presence of constitutional questions, coupled with a sufficient showing
of inadequacy of prescribed administrative relief and of threatened or impending
irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure,
has been held sufficient to dispense with exhausting the administrative process be-
fore instituting judicial intervention."
- An administrative board to which a complaint might appeal has no authority
to pass on constitutional questions. Hillsborough Tp. v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
625 (1946).
'880 Colo. App. 210, 250 Pac. 158 (1926).
2" Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 165 S. W. 2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942). The court, while finding that suit was not barred, held ".... that unreason-
able delay in appealing which causes the opposite party to act, to his injury, might
give rise to a question of estoppel." This would intimate that failure to appeal
would raise the estoppel to contest constitutionality only when such failure causes
the opposite party to act to his injury. City of Huntsville v. Mayes, 271 S. W. 162
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Vesser v. Nashville, 190 N. C. 265, 126 S. E. 593 (1925).
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action in the other party, creates an estoppel by res judicata to a later
attack upon the constitutionality of the statute under which the disputed
ruling was promulgated.
30
A major cause for utilization of the estoppel doctrine is laches, or the
failure to act at a necessary time.3 1 Failure to object while another acts
under a statute, with your knowledge, to his detriment will estop one to
assert the unconstitutionality of that statute.8 2 Laches on the part of
one's predecessors may also create the estoppel.3 3 Only a few cases re-
quire a party to change his position as a requisite to pleading the
estoppel.
34
The failure to assert a constitutional right at the proper time may
estop a later attack upon the constitutionality of court proceedings.35
Ordinarily, the failure to raise a constitutional right during trial amounts
to a waiver thereof, unless due to ignorance or duress, and an appeal
" White v. Glenn, 138 S. W. "2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); In re Pierce's
Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 8, 81 P. 2d 1037 (1938). Petitioners, as trustees of a
missing heir, waited two and one half years to object to the making of a court
order; they were estopped to attack the order. Grant v. Birmingham, 210 Ala.
App. 239, 97 So. 731 (1923). Statutory estoppel precluded collateral attack on an
assessment proceeding.
"' Failure to appear at an administrative hearing afforded pursuant to statute
will estop one later to assert the unconstitutionality of matters relevant to that
hearing. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U. S. 710 (1923).
In Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477 (1913), parties failing to appear to be
heard on classification given by an ordinance providing for licensing occupations
cannot claim he has been unjustly discriminated against because he was so classified
as to subject his business to a higher license tax than that required of others in
the same business.
Failure to contest proposed legislation within the time expressly afforded by
statute waives the right to later assert its unconstitutionality when adopted. City
of Enid ex rel Versluis v. Robinson, 39 F. Supp. 923 (W. D. Okla. 1941).
"2 Pierce v. Somerset Ry.. 171 U. S. 641 (1898). The defendant company de-
faulted on its bonds and the majority of bondholders, under statute, reorganized,
completed the railway line and issued more bonds; two years later the trustees
holding a mortgage securing the original bond issue sued to foreclose and the court
held: "Their long acquiescence, without objection, coupled with the changed condi-
tions and the relations resulting from the possession and management of the prop-
erty by the Somerset Railway, estops them from now questioning the legality of the
organization of the new corporation." Id. at 647.
" Bostwick v. Baldwin Drainage Dist., 152 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1945).
"Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558 (1900). In a
dispute over water rates the court said that ". . . there was no misleading, no
injury, no change of condition, no circumstance which could invoke the doctrine of
estoppel . . ." thus intimating that perhaps such change of position might be a
prerequisite for invoking the estoppel.
In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F. 2d 593, 606
(8th Cir. 1932), the plaintiff was not estopped to plead unconstitutionality because
it had received no benefit from the contested statute, "and, secondly, there has been
no change whatever in the position of the city because of the plaintiff's action."
. Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 128 F. Supp. 637 (E. D. Mo. 1955). Land-
owners had brought seven suits in the state courts involving the same dispute and
never raised the constitutional objection that the city had denied them equal pro-
tection of the laws; the right to raise the constitutional question on appeal in a
federal court was waived.
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based upon abrogation of constitutional rights may be permanently
estopped ;36 this is true of criminal as well as civil actions.
37
From this review of the operation of the doctrine of estoppel to assert
unconstitutionality it is apparent that it is an equitable instrument, the
importance of which can best be expressed by a realization that a consti-
tutionally guaranteed right may be permanently lost through a failure to
act or by imprudent action at a critical time.
DUNCAN IAN MAcCALMAN.
Constitutional Law-Rule of Exclusion-Federal Injunction against
Federal Officer from Testifying in State Criminal Prosecution
In what will undoubtedly prove to be a landmark decision in the law
of search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court in a recent case,
Rea v. United States,' held by a five to four margin, that the equitable
power of the federal courts should extend to give relief under the fol-
lowing circumstances: Petitioner had been indicted in a federal district
court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation of federal
law.2 A federal agent had obtained the evidence under a search warrant
invalid under Rule 41 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-
this rule states the necessary requisites for a valid federal search warrant.
Petitioner made a motion to suppress the evidence. The motion was
granted and the indictment was dismissed. Thereafter, the agent insti-
gated a state criminal action charging the petitioner with possesion of
marihuana in violation of New Mexico law.3 While awaiting trial in the
state court the petitioner filed a motion in the same federal court to enjoin
the federal agent from testifying in the state action with respect to the
narcotics obtained by him as a result of the invalid search warrant. The
district court denied the relief and the court of appeals affirmed. 4 On
writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"' Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944) ; Sanderlin v. Smyth, 138 F. 2d
729 (4th Cir. 1943).
The constitutional right to move for the return of property illegally seized and
to object to evidence obtained may be impaired, if not lost, when not seasonably
asserted. United States v. Napela, 28 F. 2d 898 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).
The court has discretionary power and authority over the waiver. United States
ex rel Athanosopoulos v. Reid, 110 F. Supp. 200 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
In Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 497 (1940), the court said,
"A defendant may waive a constitutional as well as a statutory right, and this may
be done by express consent, by failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct in-
consistent with a purpose to insist upon it." State v. Dunn, 159 N. C. 470, 74 S. E.
1014 (1912).
" Carruthers v. Reed. 102 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1939).
1350 U. S. 214 (1956).
2 Marihuana Tax Act, 50 STAT. 554 (1937), 26 U. S. C. § 2593 (a) (1952).
3 N. M. STAT. ANN. § 71-636 (1941).
*Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir., 1954), cert. granted, 348 U. S.
958 (1955).
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